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Blocher: Hello everyone, and welcome. My name is Joseph
Blocher. I teach at Duke Law School, and I've been working on Second
Amendment issues for almost exactly ten years-the lifespan of Heller,
something we'll talk about for the next two hours. But just to set the stage
for our discussion today, and maybe some of the conversation tomorrow, I
want to briefly recap some basic aspects of Heller so that we've got some
shared vocabulary.
In Heller, the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment right
to keep and bear arms extends beyond the organized militia, and it
encompasses persons and acts of arms that include certain private purposes,
like the use of arms for at least self-defense in the home with a handgun,
and potentially a great deal more than that. And in the ten years since
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Heller, what we've seen are lower courts, with one major intervention from
the Supreme Court, trying to determine the contours of that right.
And that's not easy, because at the same time the Supreme Court
recognized this right, and then two years later declared it to be fundamental
and enforceable against state and local authorities, the court also
recognized that the Second Amendment right, like other constitutional
rights, is subject to regulation. The Court in Heller listed various forms of
regulation it said were presumptively lawful. It didn't say a whole lot
about why, or about what other forms of regulation might be lawful. So in
the cases in the last ten years, courts have really been dealing with what
one Fourth Circuit judge called a "vast terra incognita," and trying to map
and fill that space.
We've had more than a thousand Second Amendment cases in the last
ten years-state and federal, trial and appellate-and the doctrine is
starting to take shape. So this is really a wonderful time, I think, to be
having this conversation. It's also wonderful that we're having it here
because as the dean said, we've got a fantastic panel with which to have
that conversation. I'm going to briefly introduce them and then sit back
down while they speak.
We're going to start on the end with Professor Glenn Harlan
Reynolds, who is the Beauchamp Brogan Distinguished Professor of Law
at the University of Tennessee. Professor Reynolds is known to many of
you, presumably, through his writings online, through Instapundit, and his
scholarship, which addresses issues of constitutional law and the
relationship between law and technology. He's been writing about the
Second Amendment for at least twenty years-long before Heller was
decided. In the mid-nineties, he used the phrase, "Standard Model" to
describe the view of the Second Amendment which the court would come
to endorse, I think, twelve or thirteen years after Professor Reynolds called
that shot. So he can tell us a little bit about the run-up to Heller and sort of
the scholarly foundation that he helped lay for the Supreme Court's
decision.
After that, we have Dennis Henigan. Denny is currently the director
of legal and regulatory affairs for the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids.
But before that, for twenty years he was at the Brady Center to Prevent Gun
Violence, where he was, among other things, the vice president for legal
and policy affairs and helped coordinate legal defense for municipalities
and states defending their gun laws against constitutional challenges. He
also helped organize pro bono legal support for people challenging
irresponsible gun manufacturers and sellers.
And then finally, we have just to my immediate right, Alan Gura.
Alan began his legal career here in North Carolina, with a clerkship for
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Judge Terrence Boyle, in the Eastern District of North Carolina. He then
moved to Washington, practiced in private practice and in government, and
eventually opened his own private firm, which focuses mostly on civil and
appellate matters.
Alan, most notably, argued and prevailed in the Supreme Court's two
landmark Second Amendment decisions. One of those of course was
Heller; the other, practically perhaps even more important, is McDonald v.
City of Chicago,' which is the case that made the Second Amendment
applicable against state and local governments. Alan is regularly listed
among top lawyers, appellate and otherwise, in Washington. Spencer was
kind enough to leave this out of my bio, but I was on the litigation team for
the district in District of Columbia [v. Heller], so it's good to see you again,
Alan, almost ten years to the day of when we finished briefing the case in
which you prevailed. [LAUGHTER]
So, the way we're going to do this is, I'm going to sit back down, and
the panelists in the order I introduced them are going to speak roughly
twenty minutes each, then I'll stand back up; we might have a few
questions and some panel discussion, and then we'll open it up for
questions from the audience. So, please do give some thought to what you
might ask these true experts in the field.
With that, I'll pass it over to Professor Reynolds:
Reynolds: So, let me go back to sort of ancient history. Prior to the
nineties, there was some, but not a lot, of scholarship about the Second
Amendment, a few articles here and there-Dennis Henigan was writing
about it in the '80s, and I think even in the '70s. Don Kates had really kind
of a seminal article in the Michigan Law Review called "Handgun
Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment," 2 which
was in like I think 1986 or something like that.
But there wasn't much interest, really, in the subject. Then, Sandy
Levinson, who's a law professor in Texas, wrote a piece at the Yale Law
Journal called "The Embarrassing Second Amendment," 3 in which he said,
"You know, there may be something to this whole idea of an individual
right under the Second Amendment, and I think one reason we academics
tend to ignore it is we're afraid that if we took it seriously, it might lead to
an outcome that we wouldn't politically like."
1. McDonald v. City of Chicago (McDonaldIlI), 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
2. Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REv. 204 (1983).
3. Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989).
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And that was very influential for a couple reasons. First, it was in the
Yale Law Journal. Second, Sandy Levinson is an unreconstructed lefty of
the first order, so he couldn't be called a shill for the NRA or the New
Right or anything. And third, because he's a super smart guy and it was a
persuasive piece. And after that, there was more interest.
So, my own introduction came sort of in a different way. The
Tennessee Law Review did a symposium on the Tennessee Constitution,
and the editor said, "You want to write something about the right to bear
arms clause of the Tennessee Constitution?" And I was like, "Yeah, sure,
nobody ever has." The thing I love about writing about a state
constitutional provision is it doesn't matter what you write, you
automatically get in, like the little footnotes and all the annotations and
everything, and they kind of have to cite you because, you know, there's
nothing else. [LAUGHTER]
So, I was like, "Sure, why not?" And writing about that got me into a
lot of the sort of civic-republican thinking of the time of the framing of the
Tennessee Constitution-it was just after the framing, it's 1796. So, I got
kind of into that, and then from that got sort of slid sideways into the
Second Amendment-not jurisprudence, scholarship. And then the next
year, the Tennessee Law Review said, "We want to do a symposium on the
Second Amendment. Would you write something for that?" And I was
like, "Sure." And so I did.
And the piece I wrote-which was called "The Critical Guide to the
Second Amendment"'-was basically a synthesis of the individual rights
scholarship up to that point. My own original contributions were modest
enough. Mostly, I just took what a lot of people had written already and
tied it together into what was a fairly tidy package, which I gave the catchy
name of "the Standard Model"-stolen from physics, but you know, we're
lawyers; we have to steal from somebody. And it was catchy, which was
good, so people started using it, which is always nice, as an academic.
What I did was look at the framing era thought about an armed
citizenry as a restraint on a tyrannical government, on the militia being
made up of-in the famous words of George Mason-the whole body of
the people, and the idea of armed martial virtue in the citizenry, and that
sort of thing. And how that translated into the Second Amendment. And,
as I said, it made a fairly consistent, tidy package, which had a number of
conclusions of varying interest. I mean, among other things, I concluded
that on that basis, under the Standard Model, it was hard to really make a
Second Amendment argument against licensing and registration, since the
4. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L.
REv. 461 (1995).
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militia rules required you to actually prove that you owned a gun. So that
gave the government some interest in the subject at least.
And it also had the interesting side effect of probably protecting
assault rifles, or whatever you want to call them, and other military-style
weapons, more than handguns and things like that, which was sort of
counterintuitive. It's always fun to be counterintuitive when you're an
academic, too. Anyway, it made a pretty nice, tidy package, and people
picked up that ball and ran with it, both for and against, for a number of
years. And then eventually, the Supreme Court decided Heller and,
contrary to the kind words spoken, they did not adopt my analysis at all.
[LAUGHTER]
As a matter of fact, they did something-I wouldn't say it's exactly
inconsistent, but it's not at all my analysis. The Heller opinion of the
Supreme Court did give some reference to the role of militia as a bulwark
against tyranny and the like. But it primarily constitutionalized the right of
self-defense. Under Heller, the primary driver for a right for civilians to
own weapons was to protect themselves and their household in the event of
a confrontation with a wrongdoer-typically a criminal of some sort-and
that's a somewhat different take than the Standard Model.
Now, to be fair-and this is a point that Don Kates made in a piece in
Constitutional Commentary, also, I think, back in the '80s-the distinction
between the two seems bigger to moderns than it did to people in the
framing era.5 In the framing era, a government official who acted outside
his legal authority's limits was essentially indistinguishable from an
ordinary crook. And we tend to defer to authority more, for better or for
worse-I personally think it's for worse. If I could just change one thing in
the law, it would probably be abolition of governmental immunity, absolute
or qualified. But that's beyond the scope of this talk--or maybe it's not.
Anyway, so, the distinction between protecting against a tyrannical
government and protecting against criminals seems more sharply drawn to
moderns, I think, than it probably did to the framers, who saw a tyrannical
government as just another species of criminal, really. Nonetheless, in the
Supreme Court's take in Heller, you wind up basically with somebody like,
well, the Heller plaintiffs, who were ordinary citizens living in crime-
ridden D.C. who wanted to own handguns for protection, and weren't
allowed to do so because of the very draconian D.C. handgun laws, which
made it very difficult to own a gun. And if by some miracle you managed
to do so, you had to keep it disassembled and separated from its
5. Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment and the Ideology of Self-Protection, 9
CONST. COMMENT. 87 (1992).
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ammunition, which rendered it largely useless in terms of defense against
crime.
And that, I should note, is a different result than you might get with
the Standard ModeL With the Standard Model, where the purpose of
letting people have guns is primarily to defend against the tyrannical
government, keeping the guns separate from their ammunition is probably
not a big deal. A burglar breaks into your house, you'd probably have ten
to thirty seconds to do something about it, but usually, a revolution takes a
little longer than that-enough time to put bullets in the gun and things like
that. So under the Standard Model, you might actually have gotten a
different result there. Probably not, but possibly.
Since Heller, of course, we have McDonald, which has made clear
that the right to arms also applies to the states. And we've had just a huge
amount of-I didn't realize it was a thousand cases, but I'm not really
surprised to hear that-of percolation in the lower courts, because the
Supreme Court, having sort of ruled on the big picture stuff, that there is an
individual right to arms, and it does apply to the states, has basically now
kept its hands off and not been very interested in getting further involved in
everything else.
So we have lot of questions like: Does the Second Amendment right
to arms include a right to carry weapons out and about in public? Heller
seems to say so. It says there's a right to have and carry weapons in case of
confrontation. But it didn't go any farther than that, and that was more or
less dictum. It's also the case that Heller included what a lot of us call "the
Heller safe harbor," which is a paragraph saying that none of this, of
course, overrides traditional limits on carrying guns in places like schools
or post offices or whatever, which is an exception that some courts
particularly run with.
And we've also seen courts working through things like whether the
statutory definitions of being adjudicated mentally defective completely cut
off Second Amendment rights, or cut them off only until you were no
longer insane, and how to figure that out-the extent to which felons can
be debarred from use of arms forever, even if the felony was minor and
long ago, and a variety of things like that. And of course, a bunch of cases
on the right to carry, where you have-well, I don't want to give away
tomorrow's panel on the right to carry; that would be a spoiler. It would be
like telling you that Darth Vader is Luke's father-oops, I'm sorry.
[LAUGHTER]
But I will say that the courts have not been overwhelmed with the
desire to protect the right to carry in public. And that brings me to sort of a
couple of interesting things about the Second Amendment, to me. My next
project is something called The Judiciary's Class War, and I had this
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realization a while back that we've got three branches of government, you
can elect almost anybody to two of them, but the judiciary is reserved for
people who are pretty well off and have postgraduate degrees. And the
people who are pretty well off and have postgraduate degrees-and
particularly, not just any postgraduate degree, but a degree in law-have
tendencies to think and act in particular ways, and those ways are
surprisingly similar, even across the political divides.
The culture there is big. And one example: they tend to really care a
lot about protecting words. Judges-they're lawyers, they're members of
the chattering class-so the First Amendment gets a lot of protection; guns,
not so much. The Second Amendment is the part of the Bill of Rights that
belongs to what Chris Arnade calls "the backrow kids," the people who
don't excel at education and aren't members of the chattering classes. And
the courts have been considerably less solicitous there. They have
grudgingly gone along eventually, but it is interesting to see the extent to
which the court is willing to protect rights that are not explicitly mentioned
in the Constitution, which are highly valued by sort of the educated classes,
as opposed to those that are mentioned in the Constitution, but don't enjoy
the same degree of upper-middle-class-and-above legitimacy.
Finally-and sort of as a counteraction to that-what we really have
seen, despite Heller and McDonald and all the symposia and law review
articles that go with that-which I'm happy to benefit from-is that almost
all the real action in protecting rights related to guns is still legislative. We
have right-to-carry in just about every state, depending on how you define
it. And we have shall-issue with the vast majority, and that's purely a
legislative, politically driven determination; the judiciary has had very little
to do with that. The judiciary has suggested in a few places that an
absolute ban on carrying isn't going to fly, but they certainly have not
pushed a requirement for shall-issue carry; that has bubbled up from below
politically.
Many of the other protections-again, the assault weapons ban and
such have happened for political reasons-really most of the protection of
what we call Second Amendment rights has been driven by the two
branches of the government that are not reserved for wealthy people with
postgraduate degrees. There may be a lesson in that with regard to other
constitutional rights and other aspects of our society, as well. That's sort of
beyond the scope of this talk, but as the old mathematics textbooks say, I'll
leave that one as an exercise for the reader-or in this case, the listener.
There we are. I'll turn it over to Dennis.
[APPLAUSE]
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Henigan: Thank you, Glenn. Well, first of all, I want to, thank
Campbell Law Review for including me in this symposium, and I have to
confess that I was somewhat surprised to have been invited to join you,
because I think I can fairly be regarded as a historical relic of a bygone era.
I have not been active on the Second Amendment front for about five
years. I think more about e-cigarettes than about AR-15s these days. And
that bygone era, of course, is the pre-Heller/McDonald era, when the
debate was: What is the Second Amendment about? What is the subject
matter of the Second Amendment? Is it about an individual right to have a
gun for personal reasons? Or is it an entirely militia-centric right?
I was, I confess, on the losing side of that debate, and I expect to be
reminded of that several times during this symposium, probably by Alan if
no one else. [LAUGHTER] So, even though I'm not an active participant
in this debate, I'm very much an interested observer. So, I'll try to bring
somewhat of a unique perspective to this symposium, that of someone who
remains a strong believer in gun control but is somewhat on the outside
looking into the current Second Amendment debate.
So, as we contemplate the tenth anniversary of the Heller decision, I
want to address three questions which gun control advocates and others
were asking at the time the decision came down, and address whether the
last ten years might have helped us begin to answer some of those
questions. The first question is: Will Heller itself survive the test of time?
The second question is: Will gun control laws survive Heller? And the
third question is: What impact will Heller have on the continuing national
debate about the role of guns in our society?
So, let's turn to the first question. Will Heller itself survive? I think
this is a legitimate question. The Supreme Court sometimes overrules its
own decisions. Sometimes it takes decades, as it did when Brown v. Board
of Education overruled Plessy v. Ferguson, but it has happened in other
instances in less than a decade.
I think it's a legitimate question to ask about the Heller decision. It
was, after all, a five-to-four decision that itself was a sharp departure from
Supreme Court precedent in US. v. Miller,6 and, in my view, Heller was a
potentially fragile ruling. And I say that because it was an originalist
analysis built on a historical house of cards.
The majority in Heller got the history wrong. How do we know this?
Well, ask the historians. Professor Paul Finkelman is part of this
symposium; I'm so pleased to see. He wrote this about the Heller decision:
"While the justices in the majority profess to believe in a jurisprudence of
original intent, the court's historical analysis could not get a passing grade
6. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
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in any serious college history course." Of the sixteen historians who joined
amicus briefs in Heller, only one supported the analysis adopted by the
majority. And I believe that historian, Joyce Lee Malcolm, is also part of
this symposium, which I'm pleased to see.
In McDonald, twenty-four historians joined an amicus brief arguing
that the Heller majority got the history wrong. And in fact, Justice
Breyer's opinion in the McDonald case suggested the potential
vulnerability of an originalist decision that is based on faulty history.
Justice Breyer wrote, "If history and history alone is what matters, why
would the court not now reconsider Heller in light of these more recently
published historical views?" But of course, he knew that wasn't going to
happen.
But Heller's vulnerability, of course, depends entirely on changes in
the membership of the Supreme Court. If Merrick Garland had been
confirmed as a Supreme Court Justice, there's a distinct possibility, in my
view, that Heller would have been overruled. As a judge on the D.C.
Circuit, he voted for an en banc rehearing of the panel ruling in the Parker'
case, which, of course, led to Heller.
If Hillary Clinton had been elected president, it is quite possible that
she would have changed the court's membership in a way that would
constitute a real threat to Heller. But, as we all know, elections matter.
With the election of Donald Trump, Heller is here to stay, at least for a
while. But it won't be because of the decision's jurisprudential strength. It
is, in fact, an originalist decision that defies history.
Well, let's turn to the second question. Will gun control laws survive
Heller? The stakes for our society here are very high. I know this
symposium topic is not gun violence or gun policy, but it would be a
mistake to assess the first ten years of Heller without considering it in the
context of the continuing tragedy of American gun violence and the
continuing debate over how to respond to that tragedy.
The trauma of American gun violence likely is having a profound
impact on judicial decision-making on the constitutional validity of gun
laws. It is impossible for judges to assess the meaning of Heller for gun
laws under challenge without some consciousness of the dimensions of gun
violence and its impact on American society. And from any perspective
you want to look at it, our country has a gun problem.
Americans make up about 4.5 percent of the world's population; we
have 42% of the world's guns. And we have rates of gun violence unheard
of in the rest of the industrialized world. The U.S. homicide rate is seven
times that of other high-income countries, and it's driven by a gun
7. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (2007).
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homicide rate twenty-five times higher. American children ages five to
fourteen are eighteen times more likely to die of a gun homicide and eleven
times more likely to die in a gun suicide than children in other high-income
nations. Among those high-income nations, the U.S. accounts for 90% of
gun deaths of children under the age of fourteen.
And though public mass shootings represent a tiny percentage of
American gun deaths, the profound trauma of these events affects every
American. There are places across this country that are now recognizable
by millions as sites of unspeakable bloodshed: Columbine, Virginia Tech,
Tucson, Newtown, Charleston, Orlando, Las Vegas, Sutherland Springs.
And Americans wonder-and I hear them ask this all the time-Is there
any end to this? Are these mass shootings a permanent horrifying feature
of the American landscape? And I'm quite sure that judges are asking the
same question.
So, what has been the impact of Heller on laws enacted in response to
the tragedy of American gun violence? Well, at the time the decision came
down, many feared that Heller would be the beginning of the end of gun
control. Jeffrey Toobin has written that after the Heller decision, "it
appeared that all attempts at gun control might be doomed, as a matter of
constitutional law,"8 and I'm sure there are some-maybe many-in this
room, who hoped Heller would have precisely that impact.
It's certainly fair to say that for the gun rights movement, the point of
the Heller lawsuit was not simply to strike down local handgun bans-of
which there were only two in major American cities-but to establish a
precedent that could be used to unravel the fabric of American gun laws,
and that clearly hasn't happened. As a threat to current gun laws, Heller
has largely been a paper tiger. One analysis, which said there are over
1,200 cases in which gun laws have been challenged since Heller, found
that courts have rejected those challenges 93% of the time.
And it's worth reciting some of the significant categories of gun laws
that have been repeatedly upheld. Bans on gun possession by felons, even
nonviolent felons, and other categories of high-risk individuals, including
domestic violence miscreants. Waiting periods and background checks.
Gun registration, including fingerprinting and photographing of registrants.
Safety training requirements. Bans of machine guns, assault weapons, and
high-capacity magazines. Safe storage requirements. Bans on carrying
concealed weapons and other restrictions on the public carrying of guns.
And the Supreme Court has shown little interest in reviewing these
8. Jeffrey Toobin, What's Really Standing in the Way of Gun Control, THE NEW
YoRKER (June 13, 2016), https://permacc/A35S-G95M.
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decisions. It has declined to review at least eighty-two Second Amendment
cases since Heller.
The reluctance of lower courts to overturn gun laws, and the
reluctance of the Supreme Court to review those decisions, has produced
some sharp reactions from some of the Supreme Court justices. Dissenting
from the court's denial of certiorari in the Seventh Circuit decision
upholding the Illinois ban on semiautomatic assault weapons and high-
capacity magazines, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia two months
before his death, complained that the Seventh Circuit had relegated the
Second Amendment to a "second-class right."
And last year, Justice Thomas wrote a dissent, joined by newly-
minted Justice Gorsuch, from the denial of cert to review the Ninth Circuit
en banc decision upholding California's restricted concealed carry law.
Justice Thomas noted "a distressing trend: the treatment of the Second
Amendment as a disfavored right." 0 Justice Thomas noted the Supreme
Court has not heard oral argument in a Second Amendment case since the
McDonald argument in 2010.
So, with certain exceptions-most notably, the D.C. Circuit's ruling in
Wrenn v. District of Columbia" last year, striking down D.C.'s restrictive
concealed weapons law-Heller generally, I believe, has been a sharp
disappointment for gun control opponents who thought it would turn out to
be a lethal weapon to be used against gun laws at every level. And it's
interesting that no major gun control organization that I know of has
attached any priority at all to overruling Heller. Contrast that with the
decades-long campaign to overturn Roe v. Wade. Why? Likely, it's
because Heller has not yet had a significantly adverse effect on the nation's
gun laws.
Well, let's turn to the third question. What has Heller's impact been
on the gun control debate? Well, I described Heller as a fragile decision-
at one time, at least, quite vulnerable to being overruled. But it may be that
the demise of Heller would be the worst possible result for the gun control
movement. I've called this "the Heller paradox."
The overruling of Heller today would unleash an explosion of pro-gun
activism that would be a far greater threat to American gun laws than
Heller itself. Professor Adam Winkler of UCLA Law School has put it this
way: Overturning Heller, he wrote, "would spark a backlash that would
9. Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 450 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
10. Peruta v. California, 137 S. Ct. 1995, 1999 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
11. Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
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make the political movement to reverse Roe seem like a schoolyard
kerfuffle.""
In his Heller opinion, Justice Scalia declared that the majority ruling
had taken certain policy options-namely handgun bans-off the table.
Well, Heller took broad gun bans off the table not just as a constitutional
matter, but also as a feature of the gun control debate. Whether private
possession of handguns should be prohibited is simply no longer a live
issue, and in my view, that is a positive development for gun control forces
in this country because the NRA has always wanted the debate to be about
banning guns. It makes it easier for the gun lobby to convince gun owners
that far more is at stake in the debate than whether background checks
should be applied to all gun sales-the kind of policy recommendation that
has the support of even the majority of gun owners.
The NRA-and I know this from experience because I've been
involved in many of these debates-the NRA strives to cast gun control as
an attack on a valued personal possession that is itself a powerful symbol of
individual freedom and, indeed, a symbol of a way of life. And that's why
slippery-slope argumentation is so important to the pro-gun forces. Every
gun control proposal, no matter how modest, that is proposed, is framed as
one more step down the slippery slope to a gun ban or gun confiscation.
That's the argument that the gun lobby uses to try to turn this issue into a
cultural issue.
Heller may, over time-and it may take some time-function to
actually flatten the slippery slope and allow the debate to focus much more
on specific policies that are simply sensible responses to gun violence and
that have the support of even a majority of gun owners. And I can tell you;
the NRA does not want to fight on that terrain.
So, yes, it looks like Heller is here to stay. But if Heller continues to
be a paper tiger in the legal attack on gun laws, and actually functions to
recast the gun debate in this way, the gun control movement may be able to
live comfortably with Heller for some time to come. Thank you.
[APPLAUSE]
Gura: Well, thank you so much. I'm always happy to be back
here in Raleigh, where I clerked for a little bit to start my legal career, as
the dean noted, and also, I've spoken before at this wonderful school, and
I'm so glad to have such an opportunity to share the stage once again with
Dennis, and with Professor Reynolds, as well.
12. Adam Winkler, Why the Supreme Court Won't Impact Gun Rights, ATLANTIC (June
7, 2016), https://perma.cc/GW4M-BCX6.
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I'd like to address some of the commentary that's been made here by
Dennis, and I think he may be surprised to learn that I actually agree with
him a fair amount, more than he might suspect, at least about some of what
we've seen and what we might expect to see as a political matter, arising to
and related to the Heller decision.
I do agree with Dennis, and I think it's fairly obvious that many
judges have simply not accommodated themselves to the decision in
Heller. They don't think it's legitimate; they don't believe that it's real.
And, absent being compelled by the Supreme Court to do so, they will not
enforce it. It is quite obviously a dead letter in much of the United States; I
don't think there's any serious question of that for anybody who reads the
opinions, and it's not 1,100 or 1,200 or 10,000 opinions that we can cite;
it's actually just a select few that we can look at.
I think it's misleading to look at the raw number of total opinions that
reject the Second Amendment arguments because, quite frankly, every day
in America you have thousands of judges across the land hearing and
rejecting arguments by people raised under the Fourth Amendment-
people want to suppress evidence that's been seized from them to be used
against them in trial-most suppression motions are not successful. There
are First Amendment arguments that are raised quite a lot, and it's not
surprising that someone facing a very lengthy jail sentence for being a
felon in possession of a firearm might throw in one of these kitchen sink
arguments about how Heller abolished the felon in possession ban as a
threshold matter. Those types of arguments don't get anywhere, but they
do ring up a tally back in the Brady Center's office-ding, ding-another
Second Amendment case got rejected.
So, the raw numbers are not really what I would look at. I would look
at certain-a select few, but quite telling landmarks, I would say, that really
show you how much the decision is eroding.
So, is Heller something that's going to survive? Given the intensity of
the resistance to it, I am not so sure that it will. It's interesting that a
couple of summers ago, in 2016, I was invited to be sort of the symbolic
pro-gun-rights speaker at a panel at the American Constitution Society's
national conference, and the debate that we had there-remember, this is
the summer of 2016, and everyone's sure that Hillary Clinton's about to be
inaugurated and Merrick Garland is going to be confirmed, or maybe even
somebody better from the left's perspective-the question was not whether
Heller would survive, but how would it die? And I was the one voice on
the panel that said, "Well, as soon as they get to five they'll overrule it
because they just can't stand it."
And most of my friends on the other side said, "No, no, you don't
have to worry about that; they'll keep it around"-because it's too
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politically devastating to overturn for all the reasons that Dennis regaled
you with. It just won't mean a whole lot; it will just be narrowed into
nothingness. And that didn't seem right to me. I, too, saw the votes come
in, including Judge Garland's vote in Parker, and I didn't think that the left
would accommodate Heller for five seconds. Nonetheless, whether it's
overruled as a formal matter or overruled by neglect, or by willful
disobedience, the end result is the same. This is a decision that, like any
other decision published in US. Reports, only means something if judges
are there to enforce it. In that way, Heller is no different than any part of
the Constitution itself. We have this parchment, and it says all kinds of
interesting things about the limits we place on government and the power
that we grant the government.
But, when push comes to shove, if the judges sneer at it and are
simply unwilling to give it any effect, then our Constitution is no more
effective than the glorious freedom-granting/securing constitution that was
enacted by Joseph Stalin in 1938, and we could probably find other
examples, right? It's not hard to draft a constitution which generously
secures rights. Sometimes it's a little bit harder to find judges who are
willing to enforce it, and we've had some meaningful judicial resistance to
Heller.
If the judges or justices continue to resist or overrule Heller formally
or informally, one way or another, I do suspect it will be for the class-based
reasons that Professor Reynolds noted, and not so much because the history
of Heller is all wrong. I recommend the opinions, both historical opinions
in Heller-Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority, as well as Justice
Stevens's more erroneous opinion-to anyone who can read them and
compare them side by side. There's no shortage of literature out there
about the history of the Second Amendment, but I think it speaks largely
for itself, and it's beyond the scope of this discussion tonight for me to sit
here and reargue the history of Heller for you. But the idea, the notion that
only capital "H," official, certified historians are allowed to participate in
this debate is something that's always bothered me.
Earlier on in the debate, the pre-Heller debate about the Second
Amendment, we would see this line from the other side once in a while that
would say, "Well, this is law office history"-that's sort of a way to deride
it, "We are real historians who, of course, are totally neutral; have no
political values whatsoever." You grab a hundred historians from any
campus in America; you have no idea how they voted in the last election,
right? Or, how they might feel about the general social issues of the day.
They're all neutral arbiters, they're cold scientists looking at history, and of
course, who can argue with them?
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And there have been some very official, capital "H," card-carrying
historian members out there writing about the Second Amendment, like
Michael Bellesiles, right? We all remember the scandal when a former
professor-he's a former professor now, right?
So, this book came out a number of years ago, which purported to
show through historical records that Americans didn't really have many
guns, didn't much care about guns; that this was essentially an issue
manufactured by latter-day lobbyists of the NRA and other nefarious
organizations. And this book was lauded; everybody blurbed it; it was a
fantastic book; it was awarded, I believe, the Bancroft Prize. Except that
the records that were cited to support some of the assertions in the book
would have been destroyed in the earthquake in San Francisco in 1906 and,
as people started to do more and more digging in the footnotes, they found
that this was essentially a fabulism. This was not a true account. The
history didn't hold up. The Bancroft Prize, I believe, was withdrawn;
Professor Bellesiles, I believe, is no longer teaching history at Emory. I
think they pulped the book, right? Official historian.
Use your judgment when you read things. Check the footnotes and
see if the things are there. By the same token, I myself, when I have these
debates, do not demand that people certify themselves or qualify
themselves in any way to speak about history.
For example, one of the most prolific historians on the other side of
this debate is a gentleman named Patrick Charles. I met him once. He's a
nice guy. I don't agree with him. I disagree with his views, and I would
always meet him on those views. If I were to debate him, if I were to
disagree with something that he's written, I would address his arguments. I
would not address his qualifications. Interestingly enough, he wound up as
one of the historians on this historian's brief in McDonald, and he is a
historian. It's how he holds himself out; it's what he studies-he studies
history. He has a B.A. in history. Okay, that's fine. I'm not going to say
that he's not a real historian.
Ultimately, I side with what Judge McConnell told Judge Posner in a
debate that I was privileged to see a number of years ago at the Federal
Society's annual convention. Judge Posner, a critic of Heller, went on and
on and on about how the Supreme Court justices are not historians, their
clerks aren't historians- "What do we judges know? Let the historians
figure out the history." And after he'd gotten himself going on this tangent
for a while, the response from Judge McConnell was perfect. He said,
"We're not economists either." And, for those of you who are familiar
with Judge Posner's groundbreaking work on law and economics, you see
the problem.
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In fact, anyone here in Raleigh should understand the problem of
trying to prevent lawyers from arguing about matters that are allegedly
outside their expertise, because law is the profession that translates other
people's expertise into practical reality. Here in Raleigh, when I clerked
here on the local federal court, the district encompassed Research Triangle
Park, and so, yes, there were pharmaceutical patent cases that were heard
here. And we had a big one when I was a clerk, in Glaxo v. Novopharm. I
don't have any expertise in organic-synthetic organic chemistry. And
neither did my boss. But we had a trial, and the federal circuit affirmed, so
I guess he got it right. That's the wonderful thing about law, is that you
can learn about other disciplines; you can engage yourself in other areas,
and you can present it, translate it, into practical reality.
History is most suitable for lawyers, because after all, you're dealing
with the written word, and anybody can read original documents, if you
understand the language and understand the language of the day, and come
to your own conclusions. Obviously, historians are people who do this
more so than other people, and they specialize in some degree. Perhaps if
they study a particular period in time or an area, they'd know more about
that, really off the top of their head. But this is not something that's outside
the province or ability of lawyers to understand, and judges to rule upon.
And so, it's quite appropriate for the Supreme Court, when it is called
upon to interpret the Constitution, to apply the Constitution to present-day
reality; to ask, "What did the framers of this text understand this text to
mean? How was this language used during the day?" And those concepts
that it enshrined are the concepts that we are to apply today. If the
Constitution does not mean what the framers thought it meant, then it
doesn't really mean anything, right? They're just words on a paper, and
you can fill in the blanks; they're an empty vessel, and you can pour
whatever content you want into those provisions.
So, I don't think Heller is vulnerable on the history; I think it makes
quite a bit of sense on the matter of history. But the problem is, that we
entrust this process, as we have to-somebody has to make these
decisions-we entrust it to a class of people who, by and large, are
unwilling to accommodate themselves to this and don't believe it and don't
care, and aren't going to enforce the decision; it might as well not have
been issued in some courts.
I proceed here with caution because there is an old aphorism that
provides that you should never tell people your problems because 90% of
them don't care and the other 10% are happy to hear it. [LAUGHTER] So
I don't like to go around sounding like sour grapes-"Oh, I litigate the
Second Amendment. Let me tell you how terrible it's been."
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I have not filed all eighty-two cert petitions that Dennis talked about
that were denied, but I've filed enough of them to get a flavor of where this
is going, and the reality is that I and other lawyers have clients who come
to us; they have real, serious questions that arise under the Second
Amendment, questions that, regardless of how you think they should turn
out, any fair-minded attorney or judge could say, "Well, that's an
interesting Second Amendment question. A court should decide this."
And I ask the potential client, "Where are you?" And if they are within
certain circuits, I said, "Forget it; it doesn't really matter." Because you
can't get a panel that's going to buy it. It doesn't matter what the facts are;
it doesn't matter what the law is.
You see the type of decision-making which can only be called results-
oriented, and before you think this is just me saying it-that this is just,
some right-wing gun advocate who's unhappy that he can't get all the
victories he wants-let me cite you two folks who are not usually thought
of as militia leaders. I start with a former colleague of Dennis Henigan's, I
think, Allen Rostron, right? He was a-
Henigan: Sitting right there.
Gura: Sitting right there, fantastic, that's right-duh.
[LAUGHTER] I love your article. I cite it all the time. If there's some
place that counts all the citations to an article in briefs and petitions, I am
really running up your score, because Dean Rostron wrote a really, I think,
good article, which I agree with in many ways, entitled "Justice Breyer's
Triumph in the Third Battle Over the Second Amendment."1 3 For those of
you here at home, that's 80 George Washington Law Review 703-right?
Yes. Okay.
And, just the title of the article, which came out six years ago, tells
you the story. Courts are treating Justice Breyer's dissent essentially as the
controlling opinion in Heller. Justice Stevens, you will recall, wrote the
historical bit; Justice Breyer said, "Well, even if it's a right, let me explain
to you why it doesn't mean a whole lot." And he applied a very deferential
interest-balancing approach to suggest that even D.C.'s very extreme law
would be upheld. And even back then, people could see that this is really
what the courts are following, you can call it what you want, but Justice
Breyer's interest-balancing approach is what is carrying the day in so many
federal courts.
13. Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer's Triumph in the Third Battle Over the Second
Amendment, 80 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 703 (2012).
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More recently, joining the party we've had Richard Re from UCLA
Law. Also publishing an article in the Georgetown Law Journal, when he
talks about the concept of narrowing Supreme Court precedents from
below-this is the title of the article-and the idea is that there are some
decisions of the Supreme Court that are either so wrong or so impractical or
so offensive-for whatever reason, they are narrowed from below by the
lower courts that don't give them the most reasonable construction, but
give them the most palatable one, or at least palatable to the judicial class.14
Now, as far as I can tell from reading the article, which I think is very
persuasive-he cites different areas of law where he thinks this is
happening, and then, of course, Heller is one of these areas, and Re writes,
that "the passage of time has seen Heller's legacy shrink to the point that it
may soon be regarded as mostly symbolic."
I can't argue with that. I think that's true. He thinks this is a good
thing. What I suggest to you is, put aside whether you think this is good or
bad from a normative standpoint about gun laws, how you feel about
firearms, and gun rights, whether this is good or bad for America. Ask
yourselves what this does to us as a nation that's supposed to be a nation of
laws and not men or women-we have female judges, too. Are we the
kind of country-the President has used words recently to describe certain
places where the rule of law does not usually carry the day-where you go
to the lawyer's office, and the lawyer says, "Well, you're going to win or
lose based on who the judge is, sitting today." Is that really what we want
for anything, but most especially for the Constitution?
We have an understanding that we teach at this law school and others
that we have a system of vertical precedent. The Supreme Court is up here;
then you have the intermediate courts of appeal; then you have the trial
courts; every state has its own hierarchy. And when one court says
something, the lower courts are supposed to follow it. And that gives the
law its essential value of predictability, right? One of those values that law
does is it informs us what our rights and duties are, how are we to behave,
how will the next case turn out, based upon the reasoning of the previous
case. And that requires judges to make decisions that they don't personally
like.
So, even if you think Heller is wrong and horrible and terrible-the
history was bad, the consequences for America are terrible, it will cause all
these problems-that's all well and good, but this is the Supreme Court's
doctrine, and now we have very intelligent scholars who are not gun rights
advocates by any measure, who can come in and tell you as an objective
14. Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J.
921 (2016).
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matter, this is a symbolic opinion, this is not given its best construction;
people are following the dissent.
I would make a prediction that if this phenomenon were to continue,
that a lot of the people who are okay with the practice might someday have
some very long faces when the tables are turned and something that they
care about, as a matter of precedent, is limited into oblivion. But what I'm
mostly concerned about is not the feelings of people on either side-we can
laugh about turnabout and fair play. I'm mostly concerned about what this
is doing to Americans, to my clients and to people in the public, who are
becoming cynical about the mission of the federal courts, in particular.
And it's hard to look at some of these decisions and not say, "Come
on, this is just a disagreement with Heller." I could bore you all night with
examples of this; I feel obligated to give you maybe one or two writings
from judges that I'm not sure reflect the highest allegiance to Heller.
Let's start with a case that I litigated in Illinois; a case called Moore v.
Madigan." This is the case that struck down Illinois's total ban on the
carrying of guns for self-defense outside the home. And there was a
petition to have it be heard en banc, which was denied, and we won, and
that was great. The dissenters from the decision, from the refusal to rehear
the case en banc, not unreasonably and not wrongly noted that Illinois
could still regulate the carrying of handguns outside the home; this is not
the end of all gun control. Yes, people have to be able to carry a gun
somehow, but there's going to be some room for regulation.
But, in their predictions of what regulations would be acceptable, one
piece of advice really has stuck with me ever since, and I'll read it to you.
The court seized upon the concept that even if you can carry a gun for self-
defense, there are going to be some so-called sensitive areas, where you
can be excluded from having a gun, and that makes perfect sense. I flew
here tonight from Washington-I cannot take this water bottle through
TSA, right? For sure, I can't bring a gun if I wanted to. So, there are some
places from which guns can be excluded-and we can dispute about how
we identify these sensitive places or what they might be, what are the
standards the court should apply.
But here's a list of sensitive places that the dissenters came up with:
"It should not be difficult to make reasonable arguments to support
extending that reasoning"-the sensitive place prohibition-"to areas
around"-okay, areas around-what's an area around? Fifty feet? A
hundred feet? A thousand feet? "Areas around"-here it comes-
"schools, courthouses, other government buildings, public universities,
public libraries, hospitals, medical offices, public parks, and forests,
15. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012).
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churches and other places of worship, banks, shopping centers, public
transportation facilities and vehicles, and venues for sporting events,
concerts, and other entertainment, among many possible examples." 16
What's left? [LAUGHTER] You have the right to carry a gun, but not
around a forest, or a building, or a person, or a molecule.
This is not a reasoned attempt to find the limits of a constitutional
right. This is an exception that would swallow the rule, and I don't think it
would fly-at least not by a majority of judges who are willing to follow
the Second Amendment. But here you have-obviously, you could form a
majority of two out of three judges out of these dissenters who would say,
"Oh, banning guns from all these places and areas around them, that's just
fine."
The other case that I always think is a wonderful example of refusal to
abide by Heller is Kwong v. Bloomberg." This is the case in New York
that upheld New York City's $340 handgun permit fee. New York City,
$340 every three years. So it's over a hundred bucks a year just to possess
a handgun in your home. That's not including all the fingerprinting and
fees. And New York's position in the case was, "Hey, we're doing you a
favor because the real cost of administering our gun control regime is
closer to a thousand-dollars, so it's a bargain."
And the court held that charging people 340 bucks to exercise the
right to have a handgun in their home for three years is not even an
appreciable restraint on the right, and it didn't even apply heightened
scrutiny to it. They decided the case under an essentially rational basis test,
but they said, "Oh, but we would uphold it even under intermediate
scrutiny-it would get no more than that because the money goes to a good
cause-namely, the City of New York."
How would that panel have addressed a case brought by people who
said, "I need to show an ID to vote, and it costs ten bucks to get a state-
issued ID for ten years" or whatever. You couldn't charge them a nickel;
you couldn't even make them get a free ID, in many courthouses. But
hundreds of dollars for a handgun? It won't bankrupt you-you didn't say
it would bankrupt you-so we're going to approve it as a matter of rational
basis.
I could go on; there are other examples. But we do have a problem,
with essentially judicial lawlessness. One more example: the case that was
mentioned here about the assault weapons ban in Highland Park, Illinois.
The reasoning of that case was a little bit different than we've seen in other
types of assault weapons ban cases-I suppose that there'll be a panel
16. Moore v. Madigan, 708 F.3d 901 (7th Cir. 2013) (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
17. Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2013).
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tomorrow discussing this. The reasoning that the Seventh Circuit used to
uphold the ban was that, regardless of whether these weapons are harmful
to society, incidents where the weapons are used have high salience in the
public consciousness. And so, this law makes people feel better, and that's
a sufficient value that allows prohibiting the possession of something that
would otherwise obtain protection under an enumerated constitutional
right. It makes people feel good. That's the new standard for infringing
upon an enumerated right. That's hard to accept, and yes, people don't like
guns, and I get that. But see if you would like that reasoning applied to
your favorite right, whatever it might be.
Where are we going? We're not going anywhere unless we have
different judges making these decisions. And that's essentially, at the end
of the day, a function of politics and democracy. And it's sad to say that.
On the one hand, I'm happy with many, if not all, of the recent nominations
that have been made throughout the country; I think these are by and
large-except for one or two people that didn't get confirmed-these are,
certainly at the appellate level, all highly qualified folks. I'm not going to
agree with all of them in every case, but I think that these will be men and
women who generally respect and understand and will seek to apply the
Second Amendment, whether they have lots and lots of guns or not. It's
sad that it requires political controversy to be able to hope that you get
enough people who would do that. Thanks.
Blocher: The first question, in some respects-and this is for
everybody-is what you think about, why, in 2007-2008, did Heller finally
get results? Because, in some respects, the materials of decision were there
all along. There was no new discovery of notes that Madison had written
about the Second Amendment. Gun regulation was not a brand-new thing.
The D.C. law had been on the books for decades. I'd be happy to be
corrected on this, but I don't think there had been a single Second
Amendment federal case striking down a law on Second Amendment
grounds for 200 years. I emphasize that not to say that Heller was wrong,
but just to emphasize again the barrenness of the field that Glenn and others
had to sow when they were writing their scholarship and the magnitude of
the mountain that Alan was climbing when he won this case. I don't know
of any federal cases, at least, though, overturning laws on Second
Amendment grounds.
So, what was it in 2007-2008 that gave us Heller, so that we are here
today on the tenth anniversary?
Gura: Okay. I'll start. Well, let me start with this. For much of
our history, we didn't have any federal gun laws. And so, in a regime
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where the Bill of Rights was understood since the 1830s to only restrict the
power of the federal government and not the states, state gun laws were not
challenged under the Second Amendment. There were state gun laws
challenged and struck down from time to time, under state right to bear
arms provisions. State constitutions also secure the right to bear arms, and
that is not an empty field by any measure. We were able to argue based on
a lot of nineteenth-century state constitutional analogues. But we didn't
have any federal gun laws to speak of, and the Bill of Rights didn't apply to
the states.
When the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, we saw almost
immediately a Second Amendment case come before the Supreme Court.
There was a Second Amendment allegation in the criminal complaint in
Cruikshank, in U.S. v. Cruikshank," which arose out of the Colfax
massacre in Louisiana where, essentially, the Klan overran a courthouse
when they didn't like the outcome of an election that installed anti-Klan
forces, and the Justice Department indicted the perpetrators of this
massacre for violating the First and Second Amendment rights of the
people defending the courthouse. And, of course, the Supreme Court then
following the execrable decision earlier in the Slaughter-House Cases19
said, "Well, the First and Second Amendments, these are rights that don't
come out of the existence of the federal government, and therefore, you
can't charge people under the Fourteenth Amendment for violating the
Second Amendment."
It wasn't until the very end of the nineteenth century that we got one
right-the Takings Clause-incorporated as against the states. It wasn't
until the '20s that the First Amendment started coming in. Why did it
happen in 2007 with the Second Amendment? The Emerson2 0 case was a
big factor. Also, all the scholarship that was done on the Second
Amendment throughout the 1990s.
We saw the scholarship well up. We saw the issue percolate in the
legal academy, and then that broke through in Emerson, which created a
circuit split, and that's what caused my colleagues to see the issue as one
that could be a live one for the Supreme Court. Clark Neily and Steve
Simpson at the Institute for Justice said, "This split will be resolved
eventually. Let's try to resolve it now, with a decent case." And they were
able to put the case together. I came in towards the tail end of that
formative process. But that's why you saw it then and there. We just
18. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
19. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
20. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).
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didn't have a base for a decision for many years, and once we got a circuit
split, it actually came up pretty quickly.
Blocher: Glenn, did you want to-it looked like you were going to
say something?
Reynolds: Well, I mean, a couple of things that I find interesting-
you know, since I teach constitutional law and all, I always talk about how,
leading up to the Brown case, Thurgood Marshall-and really before him,
Charles Hamilton Houston-spent a good twenty years litigating
peripherally related cases to close off the Supreme Court's lines of retreat
before they ever actually got to the core question in Brown. And even then,
I mean, now, of course, defeat has a thousand-victory has a thousand
fathers.
And so, after they won in Brown, everybody thought it was a great
idea, but in fact, before Brown was decided, it was super controversial,
even within the civil rights and the black communities. A lot of people
said, "You're ahead of the game"; "You're too early"; "If we lose, we're
screwed." And we had a very similar dynamic with Heller.
There were a lot of people, including, actually, the NRA, who did not
want this case brought in. They thought that it was too early and that it was
going to lose. And I have to confess, I looked at it, and psaid, "Well, I can
count four votes, but I can't-I don't feel comfortable saying I can count
five." And that's why Alan Gura is Alan Gura, and I am me, I guess.
[LAUGHTER]
But-and you never know-I mean, another example I use with
students is when they brought Bowers v. Hardwicku in the '80s, the gay
rights lawyers were like, "Well, we can count four votes, and we think we
can pick up a fifth. And honestly, we think Reagan is going to appoint
more justices, and the court is going to get more conservative. This is our
best shot for twenty years." They brought it, and they came really close.
And then later, Powell said, "You know, I think I got that wrong. I should
have gone the other way." And if he had done that, they would have been
geniuses. So sometimes you do just sort of roll the dice on these. If the-
if it's an easy case for the court, you may not need to bring it at all.
But I also think that the scholarship did provide some pressure, and
there was also popular pressure. And I forget which law professor it was-
was it Michael O'Shea who had the thing that said, "The question the court
has to face is, how can you say there is a right to abortion, and a right to
birth control, when those aren't in the Constitution, and say there is not a
21. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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right to bear arms when there is something in the Constitution?" How can
you say that as a court and have any legitimacy with the public at all? And
I think that question was being asked sharply enough that people could no
longer be distracted or fobbed off by saying, "Well, Warren Burger wrote
in Parade magazine that the Second Amendment only protects state
armies." That just wasn't going to fly anymore.
Henigan: I have a little bit different perspective as to how this
happened.
Reynolds: Shocking. [LAUGHTER]
Henigan: I mean, clearly, there was a concerted effort to pack'the
law journals with articles that were critical of the consensus judicial view
that had prevailed for many years. Not all of those articles were funded by
the NRA, but a lot of them were written by NRA lawyers. Very few
historians were entering the fray, and I've got to tell you, you know, being
on the other side of this issue, we were concerned about this, just because
the sheer number of these law review articles. Many of them, they quoted
each other. They all repeated the same thing over and over again, and they
were all a grievous distortion of the history.
The problem was that we had a heck of a time getting historians
interested in this, to enter this fray, and to-as professionals-and to draw
into question some of the historical analysis that was populating the law
journals. Paul Finkelman did enter the fray; a few others did. But it's very
difficult to get academics interested in writing articles that basically
conclude the courts have had it right all along, particularly historians on
law faculties.
And then you had an article that appeared that gets not as much
attention as it should. People talk about Larry Tribe writing on this and
Akhil Amar. But shortly after I joined the Brady organization, 1989,
Michael Kinsley wrote a piece for The New Republic, in which he said,
"We ought to start thinking seriously about the Second Amendment," and
that was-you know that it's a liberal journal.22 He is a very respected
columnist. One of my favorites of all time. And for him to give this view
credibility exacerbated the problem, and yet we still had trouble getting
historians to enter the fray.
The other factor here is that the lower courts, when they were deciding
Second Amendment cases, framed the issue in a way that wasn't very
22. Michael Kinsley, Second Thoughts, NEW REPUBLIC: TRB FROM WASH. (Feb. 26,
1990), https-//perma.cc/ST5X-39GD.
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helpful, because they would say things like, "Oh, the Second Amendment
guarantees the states' right to a militia," which appeared to be contradicted
by the plain language of the amendment, which guarantees a right to the
people. And so you had lawyers like Don Kates and others, pointing this
out when, in fact, the militia view of the Second Amendment never
depended on the assertion that it was a state's right. The question was not
whether it's a state's right. It is the people's right. It says so.
But what right is it? Is it a right to have a gun in connection with
participation in an organized militia or a right to have a gun for other
purposes? But the lower courts were framing the issue in a way that made
it very easy to refute that militia claim. That argument was central to a lot
of these law review articles, and it wasn't until the historians got involved
and explained the legislative history of the Second Amendment that it was
very clear that these articles had completely distorted it.
But nevertheless, that's where we are, and it's an interesting study in
how an interest group and an ideology can, basically, use the law journals
to make what was considered to be a marginal argument into a credible
argument.
Blocher: So, let me-I can see that there are going to be responses
to that. All the panelists would like to say something about this. But I
don't want to take too much wind from the sails of tomorrow's history
panel with Professor Finkelman and Professor Malcolm, and I don't want
to necessarily relitigate issues involving articles that probably not
everybody here has read. Although, I will echo what Alan said earlier, that
if you haven't, I'd highly recommend just rereading Justice Scalia's
opinion and Justice Stevens's opinion, so you can get a sense of what's out
there.
But I would like to ask a scholarship follow-up question because I
think one thing that Professor Reynolds said that is so important here is the
influence really does seem to be there in the opinions. And one way to
measure this is just look at what the justices cite. In Heller, the justices cite
more secondary sources and scholarship, and they cite it more often than
they do all traditional legal materials combined-statutes, constitutional
provisions, and cases. Just empirically speaking, the influence seems to be
there.
So I wonder when you are looking at the field today, do you still have
the same sense that it is as barren, or as partisan, or as riven? You know,
for every-there are innumerable stories of discredited scholars, whether
historians, whether it is Michael Bellesiles, whether it's empiricists whose
work can't be reproduced by others. This is something often said about
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John Lott's book, More Guns, Less Crime, about which other empiricists
have said, "We tried to replicate the results. We can't do it."
And Alan, in particular, you have said earlier in your remarks that you
believe pretty strongly in the law's translation function and its ability to
translate history, for example, into doctrine. So, I wonder if you think the
same for the law's ability to translate other expertise, whether it's policy or
otherwise. If John Donohue is right, and loosening concealed carry laws or
public carry laws raises the murder rate, is that something that law can take
up, because it's as sort of clear and straightforward? You can read the
numbers as well as you can read history. So, a general set of questions
about the role of scholarship today, in addition to the lead-up.
Gura: Well, I think that's a different question. The question of
whether guns are good or bad for society and whether John Lott is correct,
or any of his critics are correct, or Donohue at Stanford, that's a question
for legislators to determine. That's a question for policymakers. That's a
question for the people because, at the constitution level, this debate has
been constitutionalized in a certain direction.
So, if you believe that guns are, essentially, a social evil and they
create a lot more harm than good, and this has been proven empirically as
far as you can take it, then your mission is to convince the political process
to change the Constitution. Because the Constitution, if nothing else, is a
set of political values. Everything in the Constitution is controversial; there
is nothing unique about the Second Amendment.
We have debates all the time. We can have debates about whether we
should have the police limited by the Fourth Amendment, for example.
We'll catch a lot more criminals if we do away with all the limitations on
police and prosecutors. Maybe we can do away with the Eighth
Amendment, and people will think twice about committing crime. All
right. We can have all these empirical arguments, and arguments about
social cost are made all the time.
But the Constitution, for good or bad, has set out certain policies, and
if you think those are bad policies, then the First Amendment guarantees
you the ability to debate that and to participate in the political process. But
I don't think that it's for the courts to say, "Well, the framers said, you
know, this is-the law should be a certain way, but a bunch of people at the
faculty lounge have decided that's a bad idea, so we should let the faculty
lounge have its way." That's not the way that law works, especially not in
a democracy. So, I think it's the wrong question.
Reynolds: Actually, as an empirical matter, that does seem to be the
way law works. [LAUGHTER] So I am going to have to argue with that.
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But sure, I mean, there are all kinds of policies that you can argue, and
people do argue. That making abortion and contraceptives more available
has had negative social consequences. Generally speaking, we don't see
that as a reason to overturn Roe. It's not a constitutional argument. You
are supposed to overturn constitutional opinions with constitutional
arguments, not with consequential ones. Though, you know, as I say, that
requires a certain degree of self-discipline on the part of judges that is,
perhaps, more assumed than real.
I'd like to make a sort of spinoff on something we talked about earlier,
which is lower court resistance, because Brandon Denning is here, and he
and I did a very extensive-I guess for law, it counts as an empirical
project.
We looked at how lower courts processed the Lopez? 3 and Morrison2 4
opinions over an extended period of years. We did several articles on the
subject, and I guess one of them kind of gives away the answer. It was-I
think it's in the Wisconsin Law Review, we said-our subtitle was, "What
if We had a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Showed Up?"2 5
Because the lower courts, basically, read Lopez and Morrison and said,
"You know, these opinions, if we took them seriously, would require us to
strike down a lot of federal laws, and so we are not going to take them
seriously." And some of them were really quite upfront about that. .
And the Supreme Court told them twice: "We meant it." Then they
said, "We mean it." But then the Supreme Court didn't do it again, so they
ignored it. Are we there with Heller and McDonald? Told them twice and
now we are waiting for the third time, and maybe it's Justice Breyer's third
revolution instead? I don't know.
Although some of you have probably seen it if you are on social
media, there's a meme. It has a picture from the TV show, Archer, and it
says, "Do you want more Trump? Because this is how you get more
Trump." And in fact, I think the election of Donald Trump is, in part, a
response, not specifically to courts ignoring the Second Amendment
decision, but rather to as-here I am talking my book again-imagine that,
in an academic-sort of the class war we have going on in America
between kind of the mandarin class that runs government, and academia,
and a lot of other stuff, and the working and other parts of flyover America,
I guess you'd call it. And I think that that resistance is ultimately-if the
judiciary fails to pull it off, it's going to be very destructive because--and
23. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
24. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
25. Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or
What if the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 Wis.
L. REv. 369 (2000).
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even if it does pull it off-it's going to be fairly destructive for the
judiciary because, ultimately, its main resource is its credibility, and I think
if people don't trust it anymore, it's much weaker.
Henigan: I'd like to comment on this notion that both Alan and
Glenn have articulated that the problem here is that the lower federal courts
are simply not enforcing Heller. They're just ignoring it. They are being
renegades. And I think that notion is premised on a particular reading of
the Heller decision that I don't think is a valid reading. The Heller
decision that the other two speakers are envisioning is a decision that could
not have attracted five votes.
The opinion that did attract five votes contained some very, very
powerful dicta. I would acknowledge it's dicta, but among the most
influential dicta, I think, in the history of our constitutional jurisprudence.
And that is the dicta that actually narrows the scope of the Heller decision
itself. And we'll talk more about this tomorrow. And it recognizes that,
just as the court found that there was a historical tradition guaranteeing an
individual right to bear arms, there was also a rich historical tradition of
restrictions on that right, in the interest of public safety.
In other words, the five votes were assembled to support an opinion
that recognizes that not only is there this right, but it is a right that it, in and
of itself, creates a sufficient threat to the public safety, that there is an
equally long tradition of regulating the right to try to protect the public
from gun violence. And so, the lower courts have been applying that
Heller opinion, that is, the Heller opinion that actually attracted five votes.
And that signaled to the lower courts that you cannot enforce this opinion
the way we wrote it without recognizing the inherent threat to public safety
from the exercise of this right, and the inherent power of our elected
representatives to regulate the rights so as to minimize the risk to public
safety. So, it's a different Heller opinion than is envisioned by the other
two speakers.
Gura: Okay. If I can just briefly respond to that. I am going to
disagree with that, unfortunately, Dennis. I don't think that the courts are
applying that paragraph of which you speak.
When Heller came out, there was this paragraph about certain
presumptively lawful longstanding restrictions that tell us about the scope
of the right and the Supreme Court gave some examples, and Dennis
Henigan's organization said, "Ah-ha. See, it's not so bad. We've got this
exception-this list of exceptions that's going to make everything okay."
And it was controversial. People thought maybe this was designed to get
Justice Kennedy's vote, but we don't really know. None of us were in the
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room. We don't know whether this was required to get so-and-so's vote or
not.
But what I can tell you after ten years of litigating in this area, is that
paragraph has not actually been all that consequential. The only thing it's
really done-it's disposed of a lot of the facial challenges to felon
disarmament laws-and I'll talk about that more on the panel tomorrow-
but it has not solved the question of felon disarmament, because of that
word "presumptively" there. I don't want to discuss the paragraph. What I
would like to tell you, though, if I were going to make a list of the five or
ten worst Second Amendment decisions in the wake of Heller that totally
ignore the opinion and are essentially fabricating law, that paragraph
doesn't feature in them. It's not really been where the courts have gone off
the rails. And, in my view, if you look to see how the courts evaded
Heller, they reduced everything to interest balancing. They have applied,
essentially, rational basis review, whether they call it intermediate scrutiny,
or, as we saw in one of my cases a couple weeks ago, strict scrutiny. It's a
rational basis case. Don't be fooled.
This is what we've been reduced to. There is this magnetic,
unyielding attraction of courts to shove every single thing into interest
balancing, and apply some standard of review, and that, of course, is
extraordinarily empowering to judges, because regardless of what standard
you claim to be using, you can always cook the result to come out the way
you want, and that's what they're doing. One of the striking things about
the Wrenn decision, in which the D.C. Circuit got rid of the may-issue
carry law there-is that it approached the question in a categorical sense: If
this is a destruction of the right, we're not going to get to interest
balancing. This is simply-the law is incompatible with the regulation that
you have here, which was, of course, the way that Heller itself came out.
And, I say it until I'm blue in the face, but judges don't care: Heller
didn't use interest balancing. Heller simply said the amendment means a
certain thing. These rules are incompatible with it. We don't need to get
into construction. But judges want construction. They don't care about
that paragraph too much. Sometimes they do, but usually they don't. They
just balance everything into oblivion. That's really been the problem.
Blocher: So, let me ask one more question, and then I want to open
it up, because what Alan's describing here is the debate about whether
Heller is essentially being overturned in the lower courts, and we can have
a debate about that. But you all also talked about-and Dennis this was in
your comments and Alan, yours as well-the idea that Heller itself would
be outright overturned by a future Supreme Court, and I just want to revisit
that, because I think I have a different take on this maybe than both of you.
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One thing that was remarkable about Heller when it came out was,
this was in the middle of a presidential campaign-both Obama and
McCain immediately came out and said they supported the results; 75% of
Americans support the results. The political parties both said they endorse
it, endorse the Second Amendment, support Second Amendment rights.
It's not like Roe that way. It's not like Citizens United that way. I mean, if
you look at the platform speeches that are given by the Democrats or
Republicans, they have Supreme Court decisions in their sights. And I
haven't heard that about Heller.
And even on Garland, you know, there were allegations made about
his vote in Parker and a few other cases that he was going to be an anti-
Second Amendment justice if confirmed. The people who supported him if
you thought that's what they wanted, you might have thought they'd
embrace that. And they didn't. They said, "No, that's wrong. He's not an
anti-Second Amendment justice." They pointed out, you know, Judge
Randolph voted with him in the Parker vote, which was just to go en banc.
It wasn't to necessarily overturn the decision.
So, I guess I wonder, it does sound like you kind of come around to
this at the end, but there's no major-that I've heard-push from the
Democratic Party or from one of the gun control groups, so where would
that come from, and do you see it as likely?
Henigan: Well, I think the situation would have been different if, in
the wake of Heller, lower courts began to strike down gun laws, and they
did not. And so-and it was, in fact, I think, the dicta about the long
tradition of presumptively valid gun laws that was immediately latched
onto by the lower courts in upholding gun laws that were under attack.
And I think that-I think the situation would be radically changed,
and I think the gun control groups would, in fact, rally against Heller, if
there were any reason to believe that the Heller was becoming a potent
weapon that was going to begin to unravel our gun laws. And so the last
chapter of this story has not yet been written, and I certainly was appalled
by the Wrenn decision. I was shocked that there was no en banc review of
the Wrenn decision. If you had Wrenn decisions popping up all over the
country striking down not only carry-in-public laws and restrictions, but
other kinds of gun laws, I think you'd see a different dynamic toward
Heller. But the way things are going, I think Heller is here to stay.
Gura: Well, we're working on it, Dennis. [LAUGHTER] You
know, I'm doing the best I can. Okay? It's not easy.
We've seen a very smart strategy from the other side in not sending
things to the Supreme Court when they lose, and they have lost a bunch of
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cases. They just don't petition for cert on those. And that's why you can
now carry a handgun if you want in Chicago and Washington D.C. Go
through some hoops, but everything in Chicago and Washington, D.C. has
hoops in it. I always tell people, "Look, if I can make guns as regulated in
Chicago as everything else is regulated in Chicago, that's fantastic." It's
not a place that has a lot of freedom, generally speaking, in other facets of
life.
But where would this come from? I think it would come from the
culture of the judges and their belief system, and it doesn't matter what the
Democratic or Republican parties say about Heller and their platforms or
what they don't say about it. The hatred, and derision, and hostility of
these judges to these decisions is palpable. I've been before them, and I've
felt it, and I've seen it.
And a word about-you mentioned Judge Randolph, a George H.W.
Bush appointee. Karen Henderson also on that court, a Republican
appointee; the most strident skeptics of Heller that you might find. These
are not judges that any gun rights advocate would necessarily love to see in
a case in the D.C. Circuit.
And that brings me to something else. There's a misconception out
there that, "Oh, this is all, you know, if we get Republican judges, they'll
vote one way, and if you get Democrat judges, we'll get a different
decision." I am not sure that's true. I haven't done the math, so this could
be wildly wrong. But anecdotally speaking, my back-of-the-envelope
guesstimate is that we get a few; occasionally, we'll get the vote of
somebody who was nominated by a Democratic president. We might get
50 or 60% of the Republicans. So you can do the math. It's not great. I
can think of any number of Republican appointees who are as hostile to this
right as anyone that you can name. And they are not going to turn up in the
vote for enforcing Heller in any way, ever.
Reynolds: They're country club Republicans, not gun club
Republicans. Is that what you're saying?
Gura: I don't know what country club they belong to, or if they
belong to a country club. I don't belong to a country club or a gun club, so,
I am at the Y. I don't see any judges there. [LAUGHTER] I'm in
Alexandria. But no, it's definitely a cultural problem. And they hate this
decision. They'll get rid of it, and they don't care what the politicians say.
When they are there in that conference room, and they are taking a vote,
when they get to five votes, this thing is gone. And I would bet all the
money in the world, especially if it's in your pocket, on that.
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Blocher: All right. With that, I'd like to open it up for questions.
Any from the audience, in order to pick up the audio for the videos here,
we have a roving mic. I am happy to keep asking. I've got a lot. But if
you'd like to ask, please raise your hand, and we have a mic circulating.
Valone: My name's Paul Valone. I direct Grass Roots North
Carolina, the state's primary gun rights organization. In twenty-five years,
it has dawned on me that it has become popular in this debate to say that a
school of thought or a person's work is somehow wrong or discredited
without actually saying what's wrong or discredited about it. I have read
Joyce Lee Malcolm's To Keep and Bear Arms: Origins of an Anglo-
American Right, and by all accounts and by all appearances, it's
extraordinarily well documented, in terms of documenting the intent of the
framers in drafting the Second Amendment. So, my question to you is, you
have said that the history behind Heller is wrong or that it defies reality-I
realize we are kind of limited on time here, but what's wrong, and what
defies reality, specifically?
Henigan: Well, I'm just going to barge in and answer it. The fact of
the matter is, if you analyze the legislative history of the Second
Amendment, which I think is the most directly relevant historical material,
you see that the debate the framers were having was entirely about the
militia. It was not about the need to ensure the right to self-defense at all.
I've written quite a bit about this myself. I've done my own law office
history; I have to confess. As Glenn said, I was one of the few writing
about it during this early period, although not as early as you think, Glenn.
And you know, I've got to tell you, when I first started working on
these issues, and I thought, "Well, I've got to look at some of this original
historical material myself" And I expected to find that well, geez, all these
colonial leaders, I mean, they liked guns. They carried guns around. I'm
going to find that guns were highly valued by framers of the Constitution,
and we're going to have to figure out how to make some kind of argument
based on contemporary circumstances. We're going to have to diminish
the significance of the history.
And then I started reading the actual debates in the First Congress, and
in the ratifying conventions of the states. And I realized, "My goodness.
Actually, this is about the militia." And most of the historians, by far, who
have looked at it have concluded the same thing. For example-I'll just
give you one example from the legislative history-Madison's original
draft of the Second Amendment had a conscientious objector clause. Now,
if his intent was to create a personal right to be armed, divorced from
militia service, why would it ever occur to him to put a conscientious
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objector clause in the Second Amendment? Now, it didn't survive. It was
actually taken out because those who were supporting the Second
Amendment thought that it would serve to weaken the militia, but it was all
about the militia. So that's just an example of the kind of historical fact
that is largely ignored by much of this pro-gun writing.
As far as Joyce Malcolm's work, I would recommend that you read
the work of Lois Schwoerer of George Washington University, who is
probably the leading authority on the English Bill of Rights of 1689, which
pro-gun people say is the progenitor of the Second Amendment. I would
suggest you read some of her work because she does a pretty nice job
providing the other side to the interpretation of the English Bill of Rights.
Reynolds: I'd just like to jump in with a question, because, I mean,
militia discussion seems so old hat now, but since we have it, when the
Second Amendment talks about the militia, it says, "A well-regulated
militia, being necessary to the security of a free state." Now, I think it's
beyond dispute that we don't have what the framer's regarded as a well-
regulated militia in any sense or form. And does that mean that what we
have right now is unsecure and unfree? And if you believe that, and if you
believe that the militia clause of the Second Amendment has force, isn't the
federal government in default on its Second Amendment responsibilities?
And if the federal government is in default on its Second Amendment
responsibilities, what's the remedy for that? One part remedy might be
self-help by people arming themselves since they can no longer count on
the government to maintain the militia that the Second Amendment says is
necessary to a free society. Just a thought.
Blocher: Question from the audience, from an historian, no less.
Finkelman: From a historian, yeah. I want to suggest to Glenn, and I
want to respond to that in this way, which is that the Second Amendment
says that a well-regulated militia is necessary for the security of the free
state, and that the states have the obligation to maintain a well-regulated
militia, if they choose to do so. The federal government in Article 1, not in
the Second Amendment, has an obligation to arm those militias and to have
set up uniform rules for the militias, et cetera.
Now, the history of the militias is pretty clear. Militias existed in
most states until the Civil War, although, for example, Delaware did not
have a militia in 1860. And since the Civil War, most states have
voluntarily abolished their militias and instead have accepted the National
Guard, which functions as the state militia and is the functional equivalent
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to the state militia; although some states, such as Texas, still maintain its
own state militia.
So, it's not the federal government that would be in default. The
federal government made an offer to the states: "We'll take over the whole
thing. We'll have National Guard, and if you like that, then you can opt in,
or you can have, as Texas does, both the National Guard and the Second
Amend-and the state militia." So, I don't think there is a-
Reynolds: Well, of course, we got the National Guard primarily
because the state militias of some of the southwestern states refused to
invade Mexico, and Attorney General Wickersham opined in 1912 that
they were within their right to do so, because a militia can only be called
out to resist invasion or suppress an insurrection, not to invade other
countries. And lo and behold, we instantly get a force that we can use for
foreign adventures. So, I would suggest that-
Finkelman: Well, wait a minute.
Reynolds: -the National Guard is absolute-no, I'm sorry-the
National Guard is absolutely not a substitute for the militia at all, but is
rather an effort by the federal government to create a new body which is,
from its standpoint, more subject to control than the militia contemplated
by the Second Amendment was.
Finkelman: Can governors call up the National Guard?
Reynolds: Yes. But when they do, they are calling up a body of
troops. They are not calling up a militia. It is, at best, as Akhil Amar said,
"A select militia of the sort the framers thought was dangerous because it
was too easily turned to political control of the populace."
Finkelman: Well, this is a debate that we could have for a very long
time, and we could burn many trees in the process, or at least pulp them
into paper. My only point is, is that, functionally, in the twenty-first
century, the National Guard functions as the state militia does. It is the first
armed body called up in case there is a crisis. It is the armed body called
up if you have a nonmilitary crisis, such as a flood or a fire, and it is
regulated by the national government under Article 1, as Article 1 says it
should be, and I think it's-if you would like to see the state militias
recreated, then you need to go to the North Carolina legislature.
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Blocher: So, if everybody is not at the historical panel tomorrow,
I'll be disappointed. [LAUGHTER] There's clearly a lot to discuss here,
but there's also only a few minutes remaining, and I want to make sure we
get in any other questions.
More questions about the militias or otherwise. In the back there.
Denning: There's been a lot of discussion about lower courts not
wanting to go along with this and enforce what the Supreme Court ruled.
The Supreme Court presumably could say, "Come on, this is the way we
ruled. We're going to take another case and say it again." Have you gotten
a sense of why the Supreme Court has, basically, washed its hands and
said, "We've done what we are going to do; we're not going to say any
more"?
Gura: No. They don't tell us why they don't take cases. They
usually don't give us that level of insight into their reasoning. All we know
is what we see, which is that they're not taking cases which are evermore
ridiculous in their outcome and reasoning, and there are a few justices who
are calling out the unreason of this process. But what you see is what you
get, right? The court is obviously okay with it because it's unwilling to do
anything about it. And I think we are beyond the point of being concerned
solely about Second Amendment doctrine or the state of gun rights. This is
very concerning as a matter of having operational vertical precedent and
maintaining the court's credibility with the public. They're not fooling
anyone. I can tell you the people I interact with out there in America are
losing faith in the competence and willingness of the federal judiciary to
preserve their rights and to hear serious cases.
Reynolds: And just on the larger question-and this is much beyond
the Second Amendment-it is absolutely the case that the Supreme Court
provides virtually no supervision to the courts of appeals in general. And I
actually did some research a few years ago on the number of cases that
came out of the courts of appeals-and I am going by memory-I have-
this is roughly correct. I think in 1973, I think it was 770 published
opinions from the courts of appeal, and in 2008 or whenever it was I did
the research, it was like 30,000. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court actually
takes half as many cases. So even in terms of providing broad policy
guidance, and particularly providing broad policy guidance and then
making it stick if the lower courts resist, on any of a number of subjects,
the Supreme Court's just not maintaining any kind of significant
supervision over the courts of appeals at all anymore, and that is a much
larger problem than anything they do about gun rights.
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Henigan: One brief comment. I think that the question really goes
right to the point, which is that if the lower courts were acting as renegades,
defying a Supreme Court decision, why hasn't the Supreme Court granted
cert in one of these cases? The fact of the matter is that the Heller opinion
that attracted five votes is the opinion that this current Supreme Court is
enforcing, and they could clearly correct what the lower courts have been
doing. They could put them on a different path. They could create a whole
new precedent. They have done none of those things. Again, the pro-gun
folks are imagining a Heller opinion that was never written. The lower
courts are actually being loyal to the Supreme Court and recognizing the
validity of the Heller opinion that was written.
Blocher: I wanted to make sure that we get in-because everybody
had one chance on that question, and I see we have got at least one more
coming.
Denning: Dennis, the one decision that has come out of the lower
courts that I think disproves your thesis is Moore v. Madigan. Richard
Posner didn't have to write the opinion that way, striking down Illinois's
ban on public carry, and yet he did. Because he said, "Oh, I'm pressing
Heller's logic to the limit." And I submit that that was an effort-that was
bait that he was throwing out, trying to get the Supreme Court to take up
the case and either narrow it or overrule it.
Henigan: Well, I agree. I think that's a fascinating opinion, and it's
one that deserves some thought. Judge Posner is the judge who said that
Heller was a massive snow job. So, he thought Heller got the history
completely wrong. And, you know, he is even more extreme, I think, in
denouncing Heller than my old con law professor, Jay Harvie Wilkinson.
But I almost think that part of what he was doing was saying, "You got it
so grievously wrong, and now look at what you're making me do." I think
that in his mind, what he did was a principled application of Heller. I think
that he is very much in the minority in that view, although he attracted a
majority of the panel, obviously. But other circuit courts have not found in
Heller a requirement that this right be extended beyond the home. He read
Heller differently. But I think part of this is him saying, you know,
"You're making me do this, what I regard as an opinion that was not
required by the Constitution at all, because the court originally got it all
wrong."
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Blocher: Let me ask one last question that hopefully we'll pick up
on Brannon's and bring together a lot of the themes that we've engaged
today. And we can start with Moore, because it's a case that's come up a
few times-a Seventh Circuit case involving a statewide ban on public
carry. And my recollection of this, and you who are familiar with it may
correct me, but that was the only state that had such a law, correct? That
Illinois was the only-it was an outlier case; it was an outlier law. And I
wonder how that maps onto what we've been saying about judges and their
relationship to the Second Amendment or to gun rights and gun regulation,
generally, because if it's true that they're so far out of step, then they're not
in a position to do much harm, unless the people are also out of step and
vote in favor of laws, because the judges can't pass them; they can only
strike them down. So, unless the American people-and maybe the answer
to this is just they are in certain areas-biased against the Second
Amendment in the way that you think judges are, then there shouldn't be
problems that the judges would ever be in a position to fail to correct. I
wonder if you think that's true?
Gura: Well, democratic majorities are always out of step with the
rights of people who dissent and want their rights enforced. The whole
point of having a Constitution with rights that you can get enforced is that
you lost the election, the legislature is against you, they're trampling on
your rights, and some neutral judge applying an old but still applicable
principle of law is going to override the political judgment. If you take the
view that, "Well, people are voting for this stuff, so there's no problem," I
mean, I suppose there are people who have that view. I'm not sure it's the
system of government that we have.
So, in fact, we do have large areas of the country where there are a
great many gun laws that you could never imagine any of them being
struck down. Let's look at the Ninth Circuit, for example. This is a court
that's gone en banc over and over and over again to undo the work of any
panel that remotely imagines there to be some kind of a Second
Amendment issue. This is a court that covers what, a very large fraction of
both the land mass and, I believe, a fifth of America's population. It has
some jurisdictions that are intensely hostile to gun rights. Never has the
Ninth Circuit seen a single Second Amendment violation, either facially or
as applied at the federal, state, or local level anywhere, as it's applied to
that whole region and population. We can ask ourselves, you know, "How
many gun laws have been struck down?" There have been a few, but, is it
really the case that, magically, all these years, the federal government and
the state governments have been operating without the benefit of a true
understanding of the Second Amendment and they somehow got it right the
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whole time, because they never managed to violate the Second
Amendment, or is it that the courts are simply unwilling to enforce the
right? I think it's the latter view.
Blocher: Please join me in thanking the panelists.
